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Peter L. Hahn, Professor of History at Ohio State and a Mershon 
Center Research Fellow, recently published Caught in the Middle 
East : U.S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961 
(UNC Press, 2004).  
Hahn explained that immediately after the end of World War II 
politicians implemented policies that influence current U.S. 
policy, and by looking at this period, it is possible to understand 
the “what and why” of Washington's actions in Israel today. He 
explained that the decisions made in the mid-twentieth century 
illustrate how the United States was “caught” in the middle of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, both because it could not extract itself from 
involvement in the region and because it was caught between 
competing Israeli and Palestinian interests.  
Hahn said that this resulted from policies the United States began 
after World War II. Prior to the war, British and French leaders 
took the initiative in making policy in the Middle East . 
Eventually, however, Washington recognized that the region was 
important for U.S. strategic and economic interests, and began 
actively pursuing its own policies. Eventually, the United States 
took the lead in defending Western interests in the region.  
Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower ultimately 
presided over policies that made peace between Israel and 
Palestine extremely unlikely. During the Cold War, and especially 
between 1945 and 1961, Hahn explained that U.S. fears about 
Communism spreading in the Middle East superceded any 
interest in working toward peace in the region. When confronted 
with options of resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Hahn 
said Washington prioritized its own strategic security stronghold 
over lasting peace. He contended that those decisions 
jeopardized Washington 's ability to participate in peace 
negotiations in the 21 st century.  
The book analyzes the policies of the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations. Hahn said that the approaches taken by the two 
sides were extremely different—Truman was unsteady in foreign 
affairs and distracted by events elsewhere, so his policies in the 
region were very reactionary; Eisenhower had wealth of 
international experience and took a proactive stance on the 
Middle East—but that both made U.S. interests in fighting the 
spread of Communism a priority over lasting peace in the region.  
In the book, Hahn also explores the oft-cited “special” 
relationship between Israel and the United States . He said that 
that archival research both supports and refutes the claims that 
Washington is exceptional in its dealings with Tel Aviv, and that 
there have historically been equal parts sympathy and acrimony 
among members of Washington 's elite.  
He said that these conflicting attitudes resulted in what he called 
the “Firmness Dilemma,” which led the United States to treat 
Israel with a “firm hand,” expecting the state to comply with 
Washington 's decisions. In reality, this often resulted in a kind of 
rebellion, by Israel and those sympathetic to its causes. 
Eventually, Hahn said, such people began to circumvent the 
State Department and Department of Defense, which were 
thought to be less friendly to Israel, since it was believed that the 
best way to ensure policies that would benefit that state were 
best formed in the Oval Office.  
Hahn's book traces the history of the U.S. relationship with Israel 
and looks at the way diplomacy in the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations continue to impact Washington 's role in the 
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Middle East . He said that because they both prioritized security 
and stability for the United States during the Cold War at the 
expense of peace in the region, Washington inherited an agenda 
that leaves political, security, and economic marks on 
contemporary politics throughout the Middle East. --Julie 
Rojewski  
Peter Hahn (Ph.D, Vanderbilt) is associate professor of history. 
He specializes in United States diplomatic history in the Middle 
East since 1940. He has won research grants from the J. William 
Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board, the National Endowment for 
the Humanities, the Truman Library Institute, the John F. 
Kennedy Library, the Lyndon Johnson Foundation, the 
Eisenhower World Affairs Institute, the Office of United States Air 
Force History, and the U.S. Army Center of Military History.  
Prof. Hahn’s publications include The United States, Great Britain, 
and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold 
War (1991), and Empire and Revolution: The United States and 
the Third World Since 1945 (2001), as well as essays in 
Diplomatic History, Reviews in American History, International 
History Review, and other journals and books. He is currently the 
associate editor of Diplomatic History and Executive Director of 
the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Prof. 
Hahn recently published Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy 
Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961 (UNC Press, 2004). 
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